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FIRST AMENDMENT 
In re Parochiaid: 
Church-State Wall of Separation Scrutinized-Again 
by Neal Devins 
Aguilar, Secretary of the U.S. Dept. of Education 
and Chancellor of the Board of Education 
of New York City 
v. 
Felton 
(Docket Nos. 84-237,84-238 & 84-239) 
Argued December 5, 1984 
ISSUE 
Federal aid to parochial schools is the subject of 
Aguilar v. Feltou. At issue is a provision in the Elementary 
and Secondary Education Act which authorizes compa-
rable federal funding of remedial education for educa-
tionally deprived children in low income areas w~o 
attend private schools. Specifically, the Felton case m-
volves a constitutional challenge to New York City's 
practice of sending public school teachers to private 
schools to provide such remedial education services. 
It is unlikely that the decision ultimately rendered in 
Felton will clarify the present widespread confusion in 
church-state jurisprudence. Yet, Fel1J1l might close a 
chapter on one particularly vexing issue-namely, gov-
ernment involvement with religious schools. In recent 
years, the Court has intimated that government, under 
proper circumstances, may play some role i~ the se~ular 
educational function of children attendmg pnvate 
schools. Yet, Supreme Court "parochiaid" decisions are 
so intricate as to speak only to the particular facts of a 
case. Felton may end this confusion and establish broad 
parameters for permissible government involvement 
with religious schools. 
FACTS 
Under Title I of the Elementary and Secondary Edu-
cation Act, school systems may receive federal aid for 
those programs: 1) designed to meet the special educa-
tional needs of economically and educationally deprived 
children, 2) which supplement rather than supplant 
nonfederally-funded programs and 3) extend program 
services on an equal and equitable basis to eligible chil-
dren who attend private schools. In New York City, 
starting in August of 1966, city-employed Title I teach-
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ers were sent into the private schools during regular 
school hours. Under this arrangement, contacts between 
Title l administrators and private school officials involve 
the city's processing private school requests for Title I 
assistance and private schools providing information to 
the city concerning its planned scheduling of classes. 
Private school officials also suggest which of their stu-
dents should participate in the Title I program, al-
though Title I officials need not accept these 
recommendations. 
In an attempt to ensure that Title I teachers do not 
involve themselves with or become influenced by sec-
tarian components of parochial school instruction, these 
teachers were prohibited from: I) introducing religious 
matter into their teaching; 2) permitting parochial 
school teachers a role in either selecting students or 
teaching courses, and 3) permitting private school teach-
ers access to Title I materials or equipment. Addition-
ally, public school field supervisors were supposed to 
make periodic unannounced visits to ensure compliance 
with program guidelines. Finally, participating paro-
chial schools were required to "sanitize" or strip all reli-
gious symbols from the walls of classrooms and other 
facilities before those rooms could be used for Title I 
purposes. 
A group of taxpayers from the Eastern District of 
New York brought suit challenging New York's practice 
of onsite instruction by Title I teachers at parochial 
schools. These taxpayers claimed that such onsite in-
struction did not pass muster under the three-part test 
frequently used by the Supreme Court to determine 
whether the government action violates the Establish-
ment Clause. As stated in Lemon v. Kurtzman: (403 U.S. 
602 (1971)) "First, the statute [or program] must have a 
secular legislative purpose; second, its principal or pri-
mary effect must be one that neither advances nor inhi-
bits religion ... ; finally [it] must not foster an excessive 
government entanglement with religion" (403 U.S. 602, 
612-13). Taxpayers alleged that New York's Title 1 pro-
gram has the primary effect of both advancing and 
inhibiting religion. Taxpayers further contended that 
the program has the potential for excessive entangle-
ment. 
Taxpayers claim that religion is inhibited because the 
Title I program seeks to "desanctify" otherwise religious 
elements of church school education. Taxpayers claim 
that religion is advanced in several ways: 1) Title I teach-
ers lend the prestige of government to the church 
195 
HeinOnline -- 1984-1985 Preview U.S. Sup. Ct. Cas. 196 1984-1985
school; 2) Title I teachers aid the sectarian function of 
parochial schools by improving the basic skills of reme-
dial students, and 3) unascertainable content of Title I 
teachers' instruction necessarily advances religion. 
Taxpayers also claim that: "The potential for exces-
sive entanglement [in New York City's program] is suffi-
cient to condemn the program." For example, noting 
the difficulty of monitoring possibly religious-advancing 
contact between Title I teachers and parochial school 
officials, taxpayers argue that: "any such 'system of sur-
veillance would have to be so oppressive as to crea1e ... 
entanglement." 
The Secretary of Education, the Chancellor of New 
York City's Board of Education and affected private 
school parents (hereafter "education officials") join to-
gether in this case and disagree with taxpayers' asser-
tions. Central to their argument is the contention that 
"time and experience" demonstrate that the New York 
City program "does not in fact constitute 'a step towards 
establishment' or create any of the substantive evils 
against which the clause is designed to protect." In re-
gard to taxpayers' claim that the Title I program has the 
impermissible effect of both advancing and inhibiting 
religion, the education officials assert that this claim is 
inaccurate because Title I aid is provided directly to 
eligible students, not to the schools they attend; Title I is 
a neutral program, primarily extending aid to students 
attending public schools; and Title I aid is only used for 
secular activities. 
The education officials also contend that the taxpay-
ers' excessive entanglement claim is erroneous. Instead, 
they argue that, unlike earlier cases, here "there is no 
need for continuing and intensive surveillance ... to 
prevent impermissible fostering of religion." To support 
his contention, they assert that the parochial schools 
involved are not pervasively sectarian; that Title I serv-
ices are provided directly to the students by Title I 
teachers, and that New York City has structured its 
program so as "to insulate it from rrivate school influ-
ence and assure it complete autonomy." 
At the district court level, the New York City pro-
gram was upheld as constitutional. Key to this holding 
was an identical 1980 Southern District of New York 
decision, National Coalition for Public Education and Reli-
gious Liberty v. Harris (489 F. Supp. I248 (S.D.N.Y. 
I980)). Harris was dismissed by the Supreme Court for 
want of jurisdiction since plaintiffs failed to file their 
appeal in a timely fashion (449 U.S. 808 (1980)). On 
appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Sec-
ond Circuit reversed. 
Although recognizing "that the City had made sin-
cere and largely successful efforts to prevent the public 
school teachers and other professionals whom it sends 
into religious schools from giving sectarian instruction 
or otherwise fostering religion," the appellate court 
claimed that it was bound by the Supreme Court's deci-
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sion in Meek v. Pi/linger (421 U.S. 349 ( 1975). Meek invali-
dated a Pennsylvania statute which, among other things, 
provided "[onsite] services for the improvement of the 
educationally disadvantaged (such as, but not limited to, 
teaching English as a second language)." Although re-
cognizing that, unlike Lemon v. Kurtzma11, decided four 
years earlier "the teachers and counselors providing 
auxiliary services are employees of the public interme-
diate unit, rather than of the church-related schools in 
which they work," the court in Meek concluded that this 
"does not substantially eliminate the need for continuing 
surveillance." 
The education officials' introduction of evidence 
suggesting that the New York City program had a secu-
lar effect was viewed as irrelevant by the appellate court 
in this case; the Second Circuit held that 1\-leek still con-
trols. 
It is now argued before the Supreme Court that this 
conclusion is erroneous because: l) private schools are 
not pervasively sectarian, and 2) New York City's Title I 
program ensures a secular content to its remedial pro-
grams without obtrusive church-state contracts. Taxpay-
ers disagree with both of these assertions. 
BACKGROUND AND SIGNIFICANCE 
Felton, for several reasons, will prove to be a signifi-
cant church-state decision. First and foremost, if the 
Court upholds New York City's Title I program, Su-
preme Court decisions such as Lemon and Meek will be of 
questionable validity. Those decisions of a decade ago 
created a Catch-22 situation for state aid to parochial 
schools. On one hand, the Court assumed that aid to 
pervasively religious church schools would necessarily 
have the impermissible primary effect of advancing reli-
gion unless substantial supervisory safeguards were uti-
lized by the state to monitor the aid program. On the 
other hand, the Court assumed that the sort of 
safeguards needed to effectively monitor the church 
school would impermissibly entangle the state with reli-
gion. As can be seen by the Second Circuit's application 
of Meek, Felton challenges this so-called fJer se rule. 
Second, if the Court upholds New York City's pro-
gram, Felton may create a new per se rule. This new rule 
would find per se constitutional all financially neutral 
government aid to education programs. In other words, 
since comparable Title I benefits extend to both public 
and private school students, the Court may hold that 
there is no need to undertake a searching inquiry about 
New York City's implementation of its Title I program. 
Alternatively, and more likely, the Court will pay some 
attention both to the adequacy and scope of administra-
tive safeguards designed to prevent illegal church-state 
involvements. (This possibility is heightened by a De-
cember, 1984 federal district court decision, Wamble v. 
Bell, which held that Missouri's Title I program-as 
implemmted-is illegal under the Establishment Clause. 
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Third, should the Court uphold the appellate court 
ruling, Felton would highlight the "educational costs" of 
church-state separation. All parties and the appellate 
court agree that New York City's Title I program has 
been a success. To invalidate the program, underprivi-
leged children will be denied important benefitS! of re-
medial education. Yet, that is a cost that the First 
Amendment might countenance. At the same time, that 
might be a cost that the Supreme Court views as higher 
than the wall purportedly separating church from state. 
ARGUMENTS 
For Private SchCiol Parents (Counsel of Record, Charles fl. 
Wilson, 839 17th Street, NW, Washington, DC 20006; telephone 
(202) 331-5000; For the Secretary of Education (Counsel, Rex 
E. Lee, Department of justice, Washington, DC 20530; telephone 
(202) 633-2217); For the Chancellor of the Board of Educa-
tion of the City of New York (Counsel of Record, Frederick A.O. 
Schwarz, 100 Church Street, New York, NY 10007; telephone 
(212) 566-4338) 
I. The court of appeals' application of the per se test 
(and concomitant failure to consider the proferred 
evidentiary record) was in error, for government 
neutrality towards, and accommodation of, religion 
are central Establishment Clause concerns. 
2. New York City's Title I program does not violate the 
Establishment Clause for it has: a) a secular purpose; 
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b) a secular effect, and c) does not involve (nor does it 
have the potential to involve) the state in religious 
affairs. 
For the Taxpayer (Counsel of Record, Stanley Geller, 400 
Madison Avenue, New York, NY 10017; telephone(212) 755-
2040) 
I. By requiring that religious objects be removed from 
Title I classrooms, the New York City program has 
the impermissible effect of inhibiting religious obser-
vance. 
2. The New· York City program has the impermissible 
affect of advancing religion. 
3. The court of appeals' application of per se test was 
valid, for the New York City program has the poten-
tial for excessive entanglement. 
AMICUS BRIEFS 
In Support of the Education Officials 
Briefs were filed by the Catholic League for Reli-
gious and Civil Rights; United States Catholic Confer-
ence; Citizens for Educational Freedom; Council for 
American Private Education and the National jewish 
Commission on Law and Public Affairs. 
In Support of the Taxpayers 
An amicus brief was filed by Americans United for 
Separation of Church and State. 
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